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Recommendation Nos. 1 and 2

No further action required from that as already reflected in the DDCI's 18 January report to the Director.

Recommendation 3

As you know on 11 July 1967, the IPC met for the first time since August 1964. As an offshoot of the [ ] Step IV exercise, the FI Staff 25X1 had reviewed the IPC Lists on the non-Communist countries and had prepared some proposed eliminations of statements from each of the Lists. The primary purpose of the Committee meeting was to discuss member views on the proposed reductions. Informal comments by members revealed no major problems; official written comments or approval of the proposed reduction are due to the IPC Chairman by 15 August.

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[ ] also mentioned to the Committee the possibility of future consideration of revision of the IPC charter. I assume that this is in connection with Section a. of Recommendation No. 3. I don't know how far

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[ ] intends to go in such a revision. I feel that we might consider modifying the charter and the IPC mechanism to the extent that consumer judgments of information needs could be developed on the basis of consideration of certain criteria such as impact on Clandestine Service resources, existing collection capabilities, and the true feasibility of such requirements to the DD/P collection mechanism. This of course would involve a much greater dialogue between the Committee and the operational managers

NSA review completed

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of the Clandestine Services and therefore would immediately raise the old spectre of operational security. I believe, nevertheless, that this can be done without compromising Clandestine Service activities and that more realistic guidance would emerge. We already have guidance mechanisms which function in this manner in the reconnaissance and the SIGINT areas. Here, consumers develop their guidance and requirements with some understanding and knowledge of the collectors resource posture and capabilities and this enables the consumer to express guidance in some cases in terms of "trade-off" possibilities. Consequently the collection manager can deploy his resources more effectively. Perhaps, however, this philosophy is a little "too far out" to tackle at this time with respect to application within the IPC structure.

Recommendation No. 4

No further action required as reflected in 18 January comments.

Recommendation No. 5

The FI Staff can provide you with more complete data concerning overall progress in this particular area. As for Agency-originated requirements, a few of our requirements have been the subject of question since last January. Of these, some have been returned by FI Staff because the source was no longer available. On the remaining, after discussion with FI Staff, it was agreed that another collector should be tried before levying it on the Clandestine Services. The fact of so few problem

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cases does not imply, of course, that FI is lowering its standards. I believe that increased prior consultation, improved validation, and greater analyst attention to requirements in general are major contributing factors.

Recommendation No. 6

After our new requirements procedures were approved by IRAG and officially established within the DDI and DDS&T, an ad hoc working group made up of collectors and production office representatives designed a new Form 986. The proposed new form was recently submitted to the IRAG membership for approval and as of this writing, all but one member of the Group has sent in his concurrence. We are now in the process of working out the notice for putting the form into use. The new form is designed to:

- a. Cause the originating analyst to present information needed by the division chief for purposes of proper validation;
- b. Cause the validating division chief to refresh his memory of the criteria and to certify officially that the analyst's requirement meets these criteria.
- c. Provide IRS with the flexibility needed to levy the actual requirement in a format best suited to the requirements system of the intended collector

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(e.g., on a DOD SICR form for DIA, a despatch form for State, etc.).

- d. Provide IRS with certain information needed to ensure effective handling and processing (e.g., ensuring coordination with other interested analysts, directing it to a collector with whom the analyst has had prior consultation, relating it to a collector's NIP, etc.).

Lastly, the old Form 986 was not filled out by the originating analyst but by IRS on the basis of a typescript memo from the analyst. As you can well imagine, without standard forms and procedures, we would receive requirements in all forms and shapes with division chief validation indicated on buckslips, old scraps of paper, etc. This new form will provide the analyst with a prepared forwarding memo and will help to standardize and regularize the documentation procedures. A copy of the proposed new form is attached (Attachment I).

Recommendation No. 7

Prior consultation with the collector regarding feasibility of collection on new information needs is taking place to a satisfactory degree. Attached is a copy of a recent progress report (Attachment II) I sent to Ed Proctor which partly attributes improvement in the content of human source requirements to this factor. You will note that the

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improvement in requirements has been mentioned to us by [ ]

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[ ] officers.

Recommendation No. 8

No further action required.

Recommendation No. 9

The recommendation as such was disapproved as noted in the 18 January comment. However, the IRAG membership has been briefed by [ ] on 25X1 FI Staff functions and activities. Reaction to [ ] briefing was excellent. 25X1 One of the IRAG members commented that it was the most forthcoming presentation he had ever heard on the Clandestine Services. Also, IRS and FI have definitely improved their lines of communication, and there is a very useful dialogue now going on at the working level that ranges over most of the problems bearing on our common effort.

Recommendation Nos. 10, 11 and 12

As you know, Ed had scheduled the start of the CIRL review by IRAG but other more pressing events have temporarily delayed this exercise. In the meantime, Ed and I have discussed the CIRL in terms of the types of things which might be culled out. IRS is now in the process of an experimental effort with one of the CIRL's. We are trying to categorize the types of questions with view to identifying those that detract from the usefulness of the guidance. We find that we have a peculiar mixture of guidance questions in this publication. One type is the "basic need"

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statement--for example, a type of statement which asks the field to  
"report on any attempts to overthrow the government".

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We believe that the basic types of statements should be eliminated from the CIRL. It is these which are repeated issue after issue and which therefore tend to dull the interests of our readers. However, if we do remove these from this medium then what do we use as a means to present them to the human resources community? This is an example of the issues which will have to be flushed out as IRAG tackles the CIRL problem. Attached for your information is a paragraph out of the Human Resources Group 8-12 July Weekly Activity Report which goes into a little more detail on our examination of the CIRL (Attachment III).

Recommendation No. 13

The production of useful Collection Support Briefs continues on a very selective basis.

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In addition, we have reviewed and up-dated the Sino-Soviet Arms Traffic Brief; incidentally, there has been tremendous community interest in and response to this latter guide. I do not anticipate the production of a large number of Briefs; this is in keeping with the intent of the I.G. recommendations. Briefs will be produced only when it is clear that they will serve a useful purpose to

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a collector and will not become just another weight in the bottom of someone's safe.

Recommendation No. 14

25X1 To date, [ ] continues with its project approach but in a selective  
manner. I have had some discussion with Ed Proctor concerning more  
25X1 concrete guidance for [ ]. We have kicked around the possibility of a  
special CIRL-like document for the sole and specific use of the [ ] 25X1  
25X1 [ ] Since none of us is yet certain of the most realistic  
and practical means of providing guidance, I believe it is wise to approach  
this one slowly. Further ideas, thoughts and concepts may emerge which  
25X1 will bear on the [ ] problem as IRAG reviews the CIRL question.

Recommendation No. 15

The real problem on this matter now centers on the mechanism for ensuring validation of the evaluative judgments which the FI Staff people solicit from individual analysts. You are aware of the correspondence on this subject between Ed and Tom Karamessines and of some of the misunderstanding which exists. Ed had decided to avoid any more official writing on the matter and to approach it through discussions with [ ] 25X1

25X1 [ ] Again, the pressures of Ed's job have delayed action. I intend  
to suggest to Ed that I initiate the discussions with [ ] and see if 25X1  
we can work out some mutually satisfactory arrangements between us.

~~TOP SECRET~~Recommendation No. 16

We now have one man in Brad's group who works closely with SORS although IRS is not officially on the Subcommittee. Nevertheless, the informal relationship does help to feed back information needed by Brad's people to help develop effective taskings and requirements for the on-coming SIGINT collection systems. There are still problems in this area but as we discussed the other day, some of them may be alleviated to a degree as the passage of time causes some personnel changes.

Recommendation No. 17

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Recommendation No. 18

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Recommendation No. 19

No action required.

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Recommendation Nos. 21 and 22

Not applicable.

Recommendation No. 23

No further action required at this time. However, several things are of interest and bear on the recommendation. First of all, through the valiant efforts of the CIA and DIA members of COMIREX a new list of COMIREX Collection Requirements for Planning (CCRP) was developed.

This CCRP is the most realistic we have ever had and is based on very objective consideration of coverage needs and the resources necessary for such coverage. Attached is a recent memorandum written by [ ]

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[ ] to Tom Parrott which indicates the reductions in recce coverage (Attachment IV). As you know, [ ] was one of the very early proponents of fewer missions per year although in the beginning his views

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were not popular. You are, of course, fully aware of development in connection with the [ ] study of MC&G. We believe the outcome of this effort will lead the way to significant improvements in the management of both the MC&G and photo-satellite programs.

On the exploitation front, we recently took steps to develop Agency guidelines for the processing of our exploitation requirements. The problem centered on the necessity to adhere to the intent of the JIIRG Report and to participate in the National Tasking Plan, while ensuring the most effective responses to requirements of the Agency production components. These guidelines contribute to greater order in the Agency recce exploitation mechanism (Attachment V).

Recommendation Nos. 24 and 25

At the time of the 18 January report, proposed procedures and criteria for validating and processing human source requirements were being tested. Following the test we reported the results to IRAG. I believe that I gave you a copy of the briefing outline at that time. IRAG then modified the criteria and procedures slightly and approved them. Implementation of the new procedures and criteria within the DDI and DDS&T was effected by means of a joint memo signed by both Carl Duckett and R. Jack Smith (Attachment VI). The recent progress report to Ed Proctor (Attachment II) states that the procedures and criteria have helped to improve the situation in the human source arena. Of course, all is not perfect but

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at least much of the dust has settled on former problems of procedural methods, validation responsibilities and the role of various components.

In the reconnaissance arena, paragraph 8 of the IAS guidelines paper (Attachment V) establishes approved procedures for the formulation and validation of exploitation requirements. We were purposely vague as to level of validation. In some cases validation at the Deputy Director level may be required if we are dealing with major intelligence judgments affecting programs. Requirements of lesser significance on the other hand may require no more than validation at the division chief level.

Procedures and validation on the collection side of the reconnaissance effort are operating as before but are not yet spelled out in any official document. On matters of planning or programming guidance such as the CCRP, the Agency inputs are made via the CIA Member of COMIREX. Major judgments such as these are validated at least at the office level and as the action moves up the USIB ladder validation reaches the Deputy Director level. The mission-by-mission targeting inputs normally flow through ( ) 25X1 from representatives of the production offices concerned. There is no formal validation procedure, but in cases of doubt, ( ) naturally turns 25X1 to the appropriate division chief, office director or even deputy director for validation of questionable targets affecting major trade-off decisions.

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In the SIGINT area we continue to obtain validation of our intelligence judgments on major substantive issues at the Deputy Director level. This was noted in paragraph 3 of the 18 January memo by Admiral Taylor to the Director. However, there are still some problems with the validation of COMINT evaluations. Agency representation on the Evaluation Subcommittee of the SIGINT Committee rests with a member of the SPINT Staff who wearing his SIGINT Subcommittee hat, works with IRS in obtaining evaluative judgments from analysts in production components. However, once the cumulative Agency judgment of the worth of COMINT information is formed, we have no clear cut means of ensuring that it has been subjected to validation by production office directors or the DDI and DDS&T. Nevertheless, we are now in the process of working with [ ] who is revising the two Headquarters Regulations concerning the CIA SIGINT effort and if we can sell our proposed inputs to these regs it will be a start. Attached are copies of the new regulations as we last proposed them to [ ] (Attachment VII). The underlining represents our latest suggestions and additions of new words and phrases. You will note that in [ ] we are attempting to broaden it so as to cover both requirements and evaluations and to include provision for validation of both requirements and evaluations.

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Regarding Recommendation No. 25, the 18 January report commented that IRAG would develop a program for a regular annual review of the

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requirements profile of each office. We have not yet done much in this respect. For the moment we are watching the cumulative effects of the many other little actions before jumping into a grand annual review process. It is my feeling that things are progressing and I am reluctant to create demands on the valuable time of an office deputy director unless there is a problem so severe as to require his personal attention. 25X1

But until we are certain that this is necessarily bad it would be unwise to take this bull by the horns at this time.

One further point on validation. As we complete the Agency review of the proposed reductions in the IPC Lists, I intend to forward our judgments to the Chairman of the IPC via the Deputy Director for Intelligence and Deputy Director for Science and Technology. This will be the first time that judgments of intelligence needs for clandestine collection will have been officially validated at the Deputy Director level.

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We also are making progress in the human resources area as it concerns analyst evaluations of individual reports.

Recommendation No. 26

As noted in the 18 January report various actions taken within the Agency will help to alleviate certain problems of marginal reporting by some collectors but cannot be expected to have a major impact on the overall quantities of data and information spewed out by the big technical collection systems. Nevertheless, those actions taken to date have improved our requirements and evaluations mechanism, have introduced more order and system into the process, and have helped clear the air on the role of IRS in some of these matters.

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Recommendation No. 27

Relative to implementation of the Agency reconnaissance exploitation requirements guidelines, [ ] has begun to brief division chiefs<sup>25X1</sup> on the details of procedures. He has just completed OSI and is now offering the same briefing to other office components. Further, we intend to incorporate into some regular OTR programs (Career Trainees, etc.) more material on the philosophy and procedures of the requirements and evaluation process. However, I would prefer to hold off on this just a little bit more until we have cleared up a few things to our own satisfaction.

General

Overall I am very encouraged. Naturally, we still have problems but I sense an attitude of greater understanding, a greater spirit of cooperation among all concerned with the problem. "Pat" answers to problems are far fewer and people are beginning to try to clearly define root causes of problems. Once we begin to work together in this way we can solve many things.

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ATTACHMENT I


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2 July 1968

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** Chairman, Information Requirements Advisory Group

**SUBJECT :** Progress Report on Effectiveness of Human Source Requirements Procedures

1. Following a five-month trial period, standard operating procedures for validating and processing human source requirements were established by the joint DDI/DESSAT memorandum of 4 April 1968. This memorandum reports our observations on the effectiveness of the new procedures.

2. There has been a noticeable improvement in the overall human source requirements system. Functions and responsibilities that were previously informal and poorly defined have been officially recognized and delineated by the new SOP, and a general tightening up of the whole mechanism has resulted.

3. Validation of requirements by the division chiefs, under the new criteria, is gradually improving the quality of the requirements' contents. The improvement appears to be due in part to vigorous review by many division chiefs and in part to exercise of greater care by the analyst in anticipation of his division chief's inspection. In a few instances, of course, validation is superficial; in one case a blank sheet of paper mistakenly attached by the analyst in place of the requirement was validated and forwarded to us. Nevertheless, our continuing appraisal (based on our own subjective judgment) shows that nearly all requirements are now satisfying each of the criteria. This judgment is consistent with the views of some ☐ officers who have voluntarily commented to us on the improved quality of recent requirements.

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4. The provisions for centralizing processing of requirements in IRS adds to our abilities to ensure coordination of requirements and thereby serve the interests of all appropriate production components. During the last quarter, two-thirds of all requirements written in response to NIP's have incorporated the substantive interests of two or more agency production components as a result of selective coordination. The result has been economies in analyst time, processing effort and collection action.

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5. There is room for further improvement, of course. Contacts between analyst and collectors still serve occasionally as a direct channel for unvalidated requirements; and, even when validation is accomplished "after the fact", the opportunity for timely coordination has been lost. However, we are working to encourage adherence to the procedures, and as yet I do not believe that such instances are so numerous as to affect adversely the overall quality of the agency requirements profile.

6. On the evaluation front, the centralized processing of requests for evaluation has enabled us increasingly to challenge the appropriateness of some collectors' requests (DIA for the most part) and thereby to reduce the work load on CIA analysts. Further reductions have resulted from arrangements [redacted] to have like reports evaluated in "groups" rather than as single reports. However, the evaluation process still leaves much to be desired: the initiative for selecting those reports to be evaluated remains with the collector; the means to relate responsiveness of reporting to specific requirements are not satisfactory; and the many random evaluations that are produced are difficult to visualize in terms of an orderly system designed to exert meaningful consumer influence on the planning and programming of collection resources.

7. In conclusion, I am pleased to report progress in the introduction of greater order and a higher level of quality into the system, and I am confident that we will continue to observe gradual change and improvement.

[redacted]  
**Herbert J. Jenne**  
**Acting Chief**

**DDI/Information Requirements Staff**

DDI/IRS: [redacted]

Distribution:

- Orig & 1 - Addressee
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
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Extract from Human Resources Group, 8 - 12 July, Weekly Activity Report

We are continuing our strip-mining of the Africa CIRL for the purpose of identifying those items which are truly "current" and those which are really "basic". We are going to school in this exercise because we are finding that, aside from a relatively few obvious cases, the wording of an item is as much a factor in determining its "currency" as is its substance. For example, in the  section we have two questions that are essentially the same:

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


The first is obviously a legitimate "current" question. The second is "basic" in every sense and is virtually a raison d'etre for the embassy and station. The real difference between the two questions is the wording; the specificity of the first makes it "current"; the general character of the second makes it so "basic" as to be overly obvious.

In many cases the distinction between "current" and "basic" isn't quite so clear and thus we have had to create a third category: the "transitional" item. So far in our digging, covering roughly fifty pages, we have found that the items fall into roughly equal piles with the "basic" slightly larger than the "current" and "transitional". If, however, our findings remain consistent through the rest of our survey, we cannot avoid the conclusion that most of the so-called "basic" items (in this particular CIRL at least) can be eliminated by requiring production offices to provide more sophisticated and specific questions. Most of the "basic" stuff, to put it bluntly, results from intellectual laziness or indifference on the part of the analyst.

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
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4 APR 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Basic and Geographic  
Intelligence  
Director of Current Intelligence  
Director of Economic Research  
Director of Foreign Missile and  
Space Analysis Center  
Director of Scientific Intelligence  
Director of Strategic Research

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The attached procedures and criteria are hereby established as standard operating procedure for the validation and processing of human source requirements initiated by components of the Directorate of Science and Technology and the Directorate of Intelligence. Please ensure that all appropriate personnel in your office are familiar with and follow the procedures. Extra copies can be obtained from the Information Requirements Staff.

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CARL E. DUCKETT  
Deputy Director for Science and  
Technology

R. J. SMITH  
Deputy Director for  
Intelligence

Attachments

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GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

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PROCEDURES FOR VALIDATION OF HUMAN SOURCE REQUIREMENTS

These procedures apply to human source information requirements originating in the Intelligence Directorate and the Science and Technology Directorate. They govern the processing of requirements from the point at which the requirement is prepared by the analyst to the point at which it is served on the collector. The term "requirements" includes every request for collection action, whether it appears as Form 986 or otherwise, whether it is spontaneous or responsive to a collector's request, and whether it is an ad-hoc requirement, a guide, an evaluation, or a contribution to a CIRL, IPC List, CERP, etc. The necessity for direct analyst-to-collector oral requests is recognized when time is short; however, these requests should be confirmed as soon as possible by a written request, to which these procedures will apply.

1. Analyst prepares initial draft of the requirement.
2. Analyst may check with the Information Requirements Staff (IRS) to determine whether there is a duplicating requirement outstanding or under preparation in another component, to discuss possible coordination or necessity for preliminary contact with collector, and to insure that the requirement includes all information needed by the collector and by IRS.
3. Where appropriate, analyst discusses directly with collector factors bearing on feasibility of collection; IRS/HR/OPS assists in arranging contacts as required.
4. Analyst prepares the requirement in memorandum form addressed to Chief, HR/Operations Branch through the analyst's Branch Chief and Division Chief. The analyst may prepare a requirement on Form 986, and in the case of evaluations on the standard Evaluation Form, and forward with a covering memorandum addressed as above.
5. Division Chief reviews the requirement or evaluation in detail against the various criteria for judging its validity. If he approves, he validates by signing off on the "through" line of the memorandum.
6. Division forwards the memorandum (and attachments) to Ch/HR/OPS, Room 2G40, Headquarters.
7. IRS performs further inter-office or inter-directorate coordination of requirement or evaluation as necessary, prepares in final form, makes necessary entries in Registry, and forwards to appropriate collector or collectors.

The DDI and the DDS&T request that all human source collectors process their requests for substantive requirements and evaluations from the two Directorates through IRS. IRS will assist in ensuring that all appropriate production components have an opportunity to participate in the requested action.

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CRITERIA FOR VALIDATION OF HUMAN SOURCE REQUIREMENTS

1. Is the topic a responsibility of the office and of importance to its production program?
- 2.\* If the information is acquired, how will it be used? How will it add to or change a major intelligence position or publication in a significant manner?
- 3.\* Is the requirement likely to cause new and significant information to be reported? What is the risk to the production of finished intelligence in not asking for the information? Will the information benefits justify the cost?
4. What has been done to be sure that the requested information is not already available in an intelligence community repository or exploitation facility, the files of another US Government agency, or in library or open source materials?
5. Are there existing requirements written by your office which already serve the intended purpose of the new one?
6. Should the statement of need or the evaluation be coordinated with other production components having interest in the topic?
7. Do the statements clearly and precisely define an information gap? The requirement should not be a broad description of an analytical problem more susceptible to research than to collection.
8. Are the statements so general on an obviously critical need (e.g., Soviet ABM info is urgently needed) as to serve no useful purpose to a collector?
9. Does the requirement or the evaluation encourage the reporting of detail or minutia beyond that really needed for intelligence purposes (i.e., "nice-to-have" information).
10. Does the requirement fit the responsibilities and capabilities of the intended collector? Is the collector likely to be able to satisfy it in the foreseeable future?
11. In the case of a solicited requirement or an evaluation of spontaneous reporting, would you have asked for this information if the opportunity to receive it had not been offered?

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\* Items 2. and 3. should be applied literally when no known source is available and the collection will probably involve high cost or high risk to the United States Government. A more lenient interpretation applies when a source is already available and information can be reported out at little additional cost or risk.

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